

NATO **and Southeastern Europe** Security Issues for the Early 21st Century

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both the North American members of NATO and the non-NATO members of the European Union.

Fourth, the summit reiterated NATO's commitment to the open door, a commitment symbolized by the accession of new members and the promulgation of the action-oriented Membership Action Plan. This program gives aspirant states an opportunity to engage in NATO operations in a concrete way and to move down the path toward membership. The decision by the leaders to have a review no later than 2002 demonstrates the clear commitment and determination of the Alliance to keep the door open. One of the things that was particularly striking was the cooperation that we saw between the three new members and the other aspiring members. The three new member states helped to ensure that this process of integration continues.

Fifth, the summit confirmed NATO's intention to deepen its partnerships, particularly at the operational level, which will allow greater Partner-NATO military cooperation in both planning and operations. These considerations are highly relevant to Kosovo and could be very important factors in a final solution to the conflict.

Finally, the summit produced the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative, an important measure for the long term but less relevant to the Kosovo crisis. NATO recognizes that the challenges it will face in the twenty-first century will stem from unconventional security threats as well as conventional military conflict.

As we continue our military operations in Kosovo, we need to think about how we will organize ourselves for the peace that we all believe will come. It has a security dimension, particularly in terms of an international security force that would provide security in Kosovo following the withdrawal of the Serb forces and the return of the refugees. This is a situation where we hope to build on the Bosnia experience. We see NATO at the core of a peacekeeping force and the Partner countries – including Ukraine and Russia – actively involved in that effort. The Alliance also envisions a deeper political connection as the EU begins to deepen its ties with the countries of the region. Finally, the Allies envisage an economic dimension to the plan, beginning with a conference to discuss how

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the EU, international financial institutions, and others can contribute to a reconstructed Southeastern Europe.

The most important lesson of the last fifty years, and why this coincidence of the Kosovo conflict and the fiftieth-anniversary summit is so timely, is that the story of success in extending stability throughout Europe over the past fifty years has been the strategy of integration. This strategy began with NATO and the European Common Market following World War II. Economic and political integration overcame the historical rivalries that led to three wars between France and Germany and led to the unification of Germany and the integration of the eastern part of Germany into Western structures. We support the integration of the Central and East European countries, both through NATO and eventual accession to the EU. Finally, our last but most important challenge must be to bring Southeastern Europe into that zone of integration, stability, and security.

In many ways, it is fair to say that the conflicts of this century began in Southeastern Europe and in the Balkans. We hope that the final result of the current conflict leads to a century that need not face the same kinds of challenges. We are all determined to proceed. Leaders have been encouraged by the commitment to continue, not only to solve this short-term crisis, but to deal effectively with long-term problems. Consequently, the summit can be said in all of its dimensions to have reached an important milestone in the evolution of NATO and of the European economic, security, and political environment.

Dr. Susan L. Woodward

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In his writings about the postwar settlements ending the two world wars in Europe, American historian Charles Mayer argues that there was a certain moment in each case when third ways were proposed and unorthodox alternatives suggested. At this moment in the early postwar years, people began to propose new ways of thinking and

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new policies that suggest that the past is not necessarily a trap that cannot be escaped. And in each of those two postwar eras, he argues, the prewar organization and ideas won out, with officials succeeding in reimposing "stabilization" in place of innovation.

In light of recent events, it seems understandable for us to focus on the horrors of the Kosovo crisis. The plight of the refugees is truly heartbreaking. The bombing intensifies with no end in sight. Hence it is understandable that we continue to focus on the evil of a man in Belgrade named Slobodan Milosevic, who persists in violating human rights not only in Kosovo, but in Serbia proper. But that is not really what the Kosovo crisis is about. Rather, it is about the reorganization of the Western powers, formerly termed the free world. Who, for instance, is to be included in this club? Who is to be excluded? And what power relations will exist among them? Until these powers get their act together, until they agree on these new arrangements, there will be no peace and stability in Southeastern Europe.

Three aspects to this reorganization of the West, or of Europe, have been dominant for the last ten or eleven years. The first, and the most obvious, is the desire of the peoples of the former communist bloc to be included in Europe. We saw this most clearly in the banners of 1989. This desire dominates not only the former Yugoslavia, but the entire eastern part of Europe. The idea that culture is what defines Europe gave the citizens of Eastern Europe good reason to think that they should be included in the European community of states.

The second element was the effort by the Americans and their European Allies to forge a collective response to the impending collapse of Yugoslavia. The unwillingness of the Euro-Atlantic community to grapple with this problem became clear by the November 1990 NATO summit in London, and the subsequent summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At these meetings the members of the Euro-Atlantic community essentially decided that entanglement in the Balkan troubles was not in their interest. Yugoslavia lay beyond the Alliance area. From 1992 forward, however, the major powers began to use the Balkans

as a testing range for all the new, or newly reinvented, European organizations – NATO, the European Union, the OSCE, and so forth. This rapid evolution of European security institutions was most apparent during the NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The third issue involved with the reorganization of the West was the inability and, indeed, the unwillingness of the Western powers to grapple with the far-reaching consequences of previous postwar settlements. The potent questions spawned by the settlements in 1878, 1912-13, 1918, 1947, and 1949 revolve around the relationship between nations and territory, and between peoples and territory. From the beginning the Western powers have proved themselves unwilling to deal effectively with these issues. The most recent manifestation of this unwillingness, well documented over the past three years, is Kosovo.

As we have seen during discussions at the Washington Summit, the realignment of the West is really what Kosovo is about. It is about the reorganization of NATO and the reshaping of relations among the major powers. First, the United States and the United Kingdom have reexamined their so-called special relationship and the effect of that special relationship on Europe. Of particular interest is the influence of the U.S.-U.K. relationship on the fledgling European Security and Defense Identity. Second, the transatlantic community has sought to determine whether Europe can, and should, act independently of the United States in security affairs. Is there a new troika of Britain, Germany, and France, for example, that can tend to European defense without U.S. assistance? Third, Russia's role in Europe, and in general, remains to be determined. Fourth, it remains to be worked out who really controls Southeastern Europe. Where do the lines of influence lie in that troubled region? And fifth – the only issue that *hasn't* been with us since 1878 – is whether the European Union, the international financial institutions, or the U.S. Treasury will take the lead in defining what happens next in Southeastern Europe.

As we saw at the NATO summit, there has been no movement whatsoever on these main questions. The debates over Kosovo and various new Southeastern European cooperation initiatives pro-

duced compromise policies that demonstrate the persistence of the disagreements and positions that were visible in 1990. These compromises cast doubt on the rhetoric of resolve heard at the Washington Summit.

What answers are there so far? To the first question, what about membership in Europe? Slovenia, for instance, is no longer part of Southeastern Europe; that nation is no longer included in regional cooperation initiatives, and no one sees it as a part of the Balkans any longer. Slovenia has won, but all other states in the region are being Turkified. They are in limbo, and there's no indication as to how they will emerge from that limbo or what their status will be when they do.

What about NATO? More specifically, which European organizations are responsible for Southeastern Europe? NATO – rather than the EU, as the East Europeans had hoped – is now driving the end of the division of Europe. The first evidence of this was the strenuous efforts by Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become associate, and then full, members of the EU. Once rejected by the EU, these nations were forced to default to NATO. The “open door” rhetoric of the Washington Summit suggests that this trend will persist. In other words, we are replacing the former division of Eastern and Western Europe with a new rich man's club called NATO, rather than a broader EU.

What about NATO's operations in the Balkans? As late as fall 1998, these were meant to be an exercise in conflict prevention. We saw this in the evolution of the discussion after NATO threatened to bomb Belgrade in June 1998. Instead, what NATO has undertaken is an operation involving a massive commitment to govern the region, but without the necessary mandate, skills, and equipment. Most importantly, the Alliance embarked on this colossal mission without fully informing the publics of the NATO member states, and even the NATO governments, of the likely scope and duration of this commitment.

The very language of the agenda for Kosovo and for the region demonstrates clearly how extensive and prolonged a commitment this will be. NATO has launched a humanitarian operation in Alba-

nia whose stated goals are to return the refugees, as if that were a simple matter, and “reconstruction,” as if we were still in 1945 or 1946. As for Kosovo, the only peace plan possible or made available is now gone: the Rambouillet agreement is dead, and little effort has been made to revive the plan.

What about the relationship between peoples and territory, the problem that originally emerged in the Balkans in 1878? The Southeastern European states are increasingly ethnically pure, each one has assumed a defensive posture against the others, and new NATO actions undercut each new effort by outsiders to create some kind of arms-control and confidence-building measures. Simply look at annex 1B in the Vienna Accords for the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia, and see how much the bombing has already undercut the one effort made thus far for the region.

In other words, the model of Croatia between 1991 and 1995 remains the successful model for the region. What does this imply for Bosnia-Herzegovina? It seems increasingly likely that Bosnia will be partitioned, not because of the implications for Kosovo, but because of the discontent of the parties themselves. Bosnians resent their growing dependency on Croatia economically, as well as the unwillingness of outside powers, particularly the United States, to do anything about it. For their part, the Bosnian Serbs bridle at being told that whatever they do is unacceptable. With regard to the Albanian population movements, no *status quo ante bellum* is possible anymore – no return to normalcy. Look simply where refugees and displaced persons are going: villages and towns in FYROM, Albania, and Montenegro. They are going to areas that are already majority Albanian or majority Muslim.

Serbia is the third largest recipient, measured in terms of proportion of its population, of refugees in the world. These refugees include not only Serbs from Kosovo, but also Serbs and others from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no discussion of this neglected group. In the NATO communiqué issue after the Washington Summit, moreover, Serbia is scarcely referred to as Serbia any longer – with the exception of its central Serb areas proper. The document refers to the extensive bombing designed to separate

minority districts from Serbia, for instance, and to an expansion of NATO surveillance of the relations between Belgrade and outlying districts. In its communiqué, then, NATO seems to elevate some of these areas to the legal status as regions.

The answer to NATO's dilemma thus far has been to contain Serbia, using military deterrence, rather than offering new forms of cooperation – despite the Alliance's official rhetoric. This approach resembles the effort to contain the Soviet Union in the 1948-49 time-frame. Allied leaders do not seem to realize that, until the land routes through Serbia are reopened and normalized, there can be no stability in the region. Additionally, they have not acknowledged that the Serbian population has not been offered a choice in these matters.

Italy, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Turkey, and Greece, not the major powers, are dealing with the refugees. An effort reminiscent of the "great game" in Central Asia has been introduced into Europe, moreover, through efforts to arm and train the Kosovo Liberation Army. A stalemate in the region, under the supervision of the UN, seems to be the best possible outcome for the region; in other words, Cyprus has now become the ideal, the best possible outcome for Southeastern Europe.

As in 1947 and 1948, when NATO was created and the Marshall Plan was launched in the context of the division of Germany, the implications of this new division extend well beyond Europe. Listen to the argument, for example, that the Indians have made about this bombing campaign. The actions of the Alliance are not only failing to resolve the division of Europe, but also creating a new division on a global scale. The world may witness a polarization between anti-American and anti-rich nations on the one hand, and American-led and rich nations on the other.

At present the discussion in Alliance circles center on what kind of Balkan settlement should be created when the bombing ceases, the reconstruction effort gets underway, and the refugees begin returning to Kosovo. I agree that it is important to discuss these issues at an early date. But the NATO summit failed to assemble a coalition behind the principles of a settlement. Hence I fear that this

Balkan settlement, the product of compromise, will delay the establishment of a durable postwar order in Southeastern Europe.

Dr. Steven Burg

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The following comments will proceed in two different directions. First, a word on the use of the Dayton Accords as a model for Kosovo. When we attempt to understand the Dayton process and use Dayton as a model for attempts to resolve other conflicts, we must remember that Dayton was the quintessential example of coercive diplomacy in support of territorial integrity against ethno-regional secessionism. Coercion was used against all sides in the Bosnian conflict. Ground troops were the most important element, but they were not the only element: there were diplomatic concessions to each party, and those diplomatic concessions came in discussions that continued even as the fighting and bombing went on. These are important observations to keep in mind in discussions of how we might reach a settlement in Kosovo.

Second, we should address the obvious division in the rhetoric of the West with respect to Kosovo. NATO statements typically oscillate between the rhetoric of confrontation and military victory, on the one hand, and the rhetoric of negotiation and political dialogue, on the other. Unlike Dayton, Kosovo is an example of coercion without diplomacy, rather than coercive diplomacy. Even more important, we now have the example of a powerful alliance disregarding one of the central institutional foundations of the international system: the Security Council system of the United Nations. I remind those who blithely assert that we can simply promote regional organizations over the United Nations, and who see no reason not to assign this priority to regional organizations, that the United Nations Charter specifically prohibits regional organizations from using force absent authorization from the Security Council. We ought to think very seriously about the implications of creating an international legal order in which regional organiza-